- This court in
Ashworth followed the now dominant line of authority which attributes
a more catholic meaning to the phrase "the interests of justice" in s.10 of
the Contempt of Court Act 1981 than was initially given to it in Secretary
of State for Defence v Guardian Newspapers [1985] AC 339, 350, where Lord
Diplock limited it to the technical interests of the administration of justice.
By common consent our approach is that of Lord Bridge in X v Morgan Grampian
[1991] 1 AC 1, 43: the phrase is large enough to include the exercise
of legal rights and self-protection from legal wrongs, whether or not by court
action.
- The genesis
of s.10 is of some interest and relevance. It was introduced into the Contempt
of Court Bill in committee by Lord Scarman, following the decision of the
House in November 1980 in British Steel Corporation v Granada Television
[1981] AC 1096, in which the majority of their Lordships acknowledged,
but only as a contingent discretionary factor, the public interest in the
protection of journalists' sources. Lord Scarman, quoting Lord Salmon's dissenting
speech in favour of much stronger protection, explained that his two proposed
exemptions from a general privilege for journalists' sources - national security
and the prevention of disorder or crime - were derived from article 10(2)
of the European Convention on Human Rights. He withdrew his amendment upon
the promise of Lord Hailsham LC to consider the issue, and Lord Morris thereafter
introduced what is now s.10, spelling out the interests of justice as a further
ground of exception. It should not be forgotten that in this country, then
as now, the principal source of unattributable leaks to the media – in the
form of off-the-record briefings - and therefore the principal beneficiary
of a rule protecting the secrecy of sources, was government itself (see Peter
Hennessy, Whitehall (1989) p.363-4).
The
European Convention on Human Rights
- Article 10 provides:
"(1) Everyone
has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to
hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference
by public authority and regardless of frontiers ...
(2) The
exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities,
may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties
as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the
interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for
the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals,
for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the
disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority
and impartiality of the judiciary."
- In Camelot
Group plc v Centaur Communications Ltd [1999] QB 124, 128, Schiemann LJ
remarked that s.10 "was passed in order that our domestic law might reflect
article 10 ...". While this is certainly true of the exceptions in Lord Scarman's
original amendment, and while the interests of justice may correspond with
– though they clearly go beyond – the further purpose of maintaining the authority
and impartiality of the judiciary, the protection of journalistic sources
was not at that date a recognised purpose of art. 10. It was only with the
decision of the European Court of Human Rights in Goodwin v United Kingdom
(1996) 22 EHRR 123 (the sequel to X Ltd v Morgan-Grampian Ltd),
building on Jersild v Denmark (1994) 19 EHRR 1, that the jurisprudence
of the Court drew out of art. 10 the principle proleptically incorporated
in s.10 of the 1981 Act. It did so, it is worth noting, not by extracting
from paragraph (1) of the article the words "freedom ...to receive ... information
... without interference by public authority" and conferring this on the press
rather on its readers, but by drawing out of the article's overriding purpose
a protection without which the purpose itself would be subverted.
- Lord Scarman,
the first judicial advocate of patriation of the Convention, remarked in his
dissenting speech in the Guardian Newspapers case in 1984:
"Mr
Kentridge, for the appellants, described [section 10] as introducing into
the law 'a constitutional right'. There being no written constitution, his
words will sound strange to some. But they may more accurately prophesy the
direction in which English law has to move under the compulsions to which
it is now subject than many are yet prepared to accept."
He
went on to point out the structural similarity between s.10 and the qualified
Convention rights. That there is, however, a difference of content or of emphasis
between them was exemplified in the decision of the European Court of Human
Rights in Goodwin (above). The House of Lords had concluded that the
need to prevent an unknown source from disseminating commercially damaging
information called for the lifting of the bar on disclosure under s.10, notwithstanding
that an injunction had been obtained in time to prevent publication; but the
Court considered that the injunction removed much of the justification for
lifting the bar, and that the remaining risks were not sufficient to make
disclosure a proportionate measure under art. 10(2).
The Ashworth
case
- In the Ashworth
case (above), which concerned the unauthorised disclosure of a patient's medical
records to the press, Lord Phillips MR considered the narrower meaning of
"the interests of justice" adopted by Lord Diplock in Secretary of State
for Defence v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (above, at 350), which confined
the phrase to its technical sense of court proceedings, as against the wider
meaning of the exercise of rights and self-protection against wrongs preferred
by Lord Bridge in Morgan-Grampian (above, at 43). His judgment, which
draws extensively on the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in
Goodwin (above), includes these passages:
- There are varying
rights to production of documents held by others, and differing purposes for
which the right exists. The right which Interbrew asserts to production of
the documents held by the respective defendants is derived from the decision
of the House of Lords in Norwich Pharmacal Co v Customs and Excise Commissioners
[1974] AC 133: a person who, albeit innocently, facilitates the tortious
act of another must co-operate in righting the wrong by disclosing the wrongdoer's
identity to the wronged party, and can be made by the court to do so if no
other expedient is available. The basis of the newly asserted jurisdiction
being the old equitable bill of discovery, the power does not run against
a mere witness; but it runs in respect of equitable as well as common law
wrongs.
Criminal sanctions
- At the time
of this leak the Financial Services Act 1986 provided by s. 47:
"47.
(1) Any person who –
(a)
makes a statement, promise or forecast which he knows to be misleading, false
or deceptive or dishonestly conceals any material facts; or
(b)
recklessly makes (dishonestly or otherwise) a statement, promise or forecast
which is misleading, false or deceptive
is
guilty of an offence if he makes the statement, promise or forecast or conceals
the facts for the purpose of inducing, or is reckless as to whether it may
induce, another person (whether or not the person to whom the statement, promise
or forecast is made or from whom the facts are concealed) to enter or offer
to enter into, or to refrain from entering or offering to enter into, an investment
agreement or to exercise, or refrain from exercising, any rights conferred
by an investment.
(2)
Any person who does any act or engages in any course of conduct which creates
a false or misleading impression as to the market in or the price or value
of any investments is guilty of an offence if he does so for the purpose of
creating that impression and of thereby inducing another person to acquire,
dispose of, subscribe for or underwrite those investments or to refrain from
doing so or to exercise, or refrain from exercising, any rights conferred
by those investments."
This
legislation is now superseded by the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000
which by Part XI confers on the Financial Services Authority extensive investigative
powers directed to the detection and prosecution of crimes, including market
manipulation.
The issues
- It is said by
Mr Charles Hollander QC on behalf of Interbrew that the source, or somebody
supplying the source, has plainly been guilty not only of a breach of confidence,
probably within GS or Lazards, but of forgery and of market manipulation.
By publishing the products of the first two wrongs and thereby promoting the
third, the defendants have all laid themselves open to the remedy of delivery
up and brought themselves within the statutory exceptions from non-disclosure
of sources. The defendants, jointly represented by Mr Michael Tugendhat QC,
contest each step in this reasoning.
- In the light
of the arguments addressed to us, we have to consider these questions:
- Is the detection
of crime a proper object of the Norwich Pharmacal power?
- Has an entitlement
to delivery up been established?
- If so, is
it blocked by s.10? In particular –
- What are the
interests of justice which disclosure will serve here?
- Is the prevention
of crime engaged?
- Should the
court treat the allegations of forgery and market manipulation as proved
because they are uncontradicted?
- Is the necessity
of disclosure affected by the source's motive?
- Is it affected
by an express promise of confidentiality?
- In what sense
is the decision under s.10 a matter of discretion?
- Lightman J initially
described his approach to the last of these issues in this succinct way:
"The
essential issue on this application is whether the Claimant's interest in
obtaining the Documents and its (and I would add the public) interest in identifying
the Source is sufficiently compelling to override the Defendants' and the
public interest in protecting the media's sources of information."
But
the defendants criticise him for departing from this correct stance later
on in his judgment by describing the exercise in terms of a rebuttable presumption,
and by then saying (para. 32(vi)):
"the
guiding principle is that an application for an order for disclosure against
the press should be a recourse of last resort. The Court requires the claimant
to go beyond establishing the pressing social need or exceptional circumstances:
the claimant must also satisfy the Court that it should exercise its discretion
to take the very serious step of granting the relief."
To
this they now add the judge's reasons for refusing permission to appeal. These
begin: "The decision is or involves an exercise of discretion." Aldous LJ,
granting permission, commented: "I do not accept that the reasons for refusing
permission to appeal given by the judge are correct."
- Not all the
other questions were canvassed before Lightman J as they have been before
us; but criticism is made of his reliance, in reaching his judgment, on the
fact that the source had obtained no express promise of confidentiality from
any of the defendants and that none could be implied from the circumstances,
and of his refusal to – as he put it – second-guess the advisers who had concluded
that the source could not be detected without access to the originals received
by the defendants. For my part, and whatever our conclusions, I would wish
to pay tribute to the care and thoroughness of the judge's fact-finding and
reasoning in a judgment produced under enormous pressure of time.
Discussion
Is
the detection of crime a proper object of the Norwich Pharmacal power?
- There are sound
reasons, both historical and contemporary, for holding that the answer is
no.
- Mr Hollander
points to the strong evidence that the source's purpose was criminal under
s.47 of the Financial Services Act 1986 and submits that if facilitation of
tort exposes an innocent party to an order for delivery up, facilitation of
crime must do so too. I do not accept that this follows, and nothing in either
the reasoning of the House of Lords in Norwich Pharmacal or the earlier
decisions on which it was based suggests that it does. Lord Phillips MR in
Ashworth, paragraphs 55-66, considered the nature of the wrongdoing
needed to attract the Norwich Pharmacal power and concluded that nothing
in authority or in principle confined it to torts; but the argument there
was whether it reached breach of confidence.
- The point of
the bill of discovery was that it permitted a party with a cause of action
against a person whose identity he did not know to extract from an unwitting
participant – that is, somebody who was involved but was not a wrongdoer -
the identity of the wrongdoer. The purpose, manifestly, was to complete the
cause of action (though the exemption of "mere" witnesses from the obligation
to assist seems to me inexplicable as a matter of principle and may be why
Lightman J spoke of the Norwich Pharmacal procedure as "a rule of practice,
not a rule of law"). Even in the period before the mid-19th century,
when the majority of prosecutions were privately brought, the identification
of criminals does not feature in the reported cases as a proper purpose of
the bill of discovery. Today, when prosecution, subject to rare exceptions,
is the task of the state, I can see no justification for introducing it. The
prosecution of offences, notably in the field of financial services, is the
business of specialised agencies equipped with statutory powers of search
and seizure. Each of these powers, none of them unlimited, represents a carefully
struck balance between the needs of the community and the rights of the individual.
To undercut them with a civil right to compel production of documents or data
at the instance of a person claiming to be the victim of a crime would be
to court catastrophe. For what purpose would the documents be exigible? If
prosecution, that will rarely be the applicant's intent. Here, for instance,
Interbrew say that they are entirely content to leave the question of criminal
proceedings to the FSA. If the purpose is civil process, what is the relevance
of the commission of a crime? If it has to be crime of which the applicant
is a victim, there is almost bound to be a civil cause of action. If it were
able to be a crime of which the applicant is not a victim, the limited Norwich
Pharmacal purpose would be replaced by a practically untrammelled right
to disclosure. It may appear paradoxical that once s.10 of the Contempt of
Court Act 1981 is reached, the prevention of crime becomes an admissible reason
for ordering disclosure of sources. I consider the effect of this below; but
it cannot require the prevention of crime to be read back into the equitable
right to disclosure which is the predicate of s.10. Parliament can override
or modify the common law and equity, but it cannot determine what they are.
- Mr Tugendhat
has been able to show us authority and commentary which corroborates, if indeed
it does not bindingly establish, this view of equity and the law. Bray on
Discovery (1885, p.3) advances as an introductory proposition:
"The
right of discovery exists only in aid of civil proceedings".
In
support of his corollary "Not in aid of an action founded on a felony" Bray
cites first the decision of Lord Eldon LC in Cartwright v Green (1803)
8 Ves. Jun. 406 allowing a demurrer to a bill of discovery. It is clear from
the report, however, that Lord Eldon acted on the ground that the defendants
might otherwise be made to incriminate themselves, which is not quite the
same thing. But in the earlier case of Montague v Dudman (1751) 2 Ves.
Sen. 396, also cited by Bray, Lord Hardwicke had said:
"A
bill of discovery lies here in aid of some proceedings in this court in order
to deliver the party from the necessity of procuring evidence, or to aid the
proceeding in some suit relating to a civil right in a court of common law,
as an action; but not to aid the prosecution of an indictment of information,
or to aid the defence to it."
Lord
Hardwicke was adjudicating on a demurrer to a prayer for an injunction to
stay a claim to a common law mandamus, and for discovery in aid of it; but
the passage cited above is central to his reasons for allowing the demurrer
as to discovery. Mr Anthony Walton QC, replying at the bar of the House in
Norwich Pharmacal (at 166), therefore had good grounds for his submission
that equity refused to aid the obtaining of evidence in relation to criminal
proceedings or evidence which would result in self-incrimination. Nothing
said in their Lordships' speeches indicates a different view.
- Private prosecutions
are still permissible and from time to time prove their value as a longstop
behind an inert public authority. I would want to leave open the situation
where an applicant can show a genuine need or wish to bring a private prosecution
but requires the respondent's help in identifying the wrongdoer. It is not
this case. In a case such as this, which is the ordinary case, I would hold
that it is immaterial to the Norwich Pharmacal jurisdiction that the
wrongdoer may have been guilty of a crime. What matters is that the applicant
means to bring a civil action, or otherwise to assert its legal rights (see
British Steel, above, per Lord Wilberforce at 1174), as soon as it
knows who the correct defendant is.
- I do not accept
Mr Hollander's submission, at least as a general proposition, that something
less will do. I can accept that in the extreme circumstances confronting Sir
Richard Scott V-C in P v T Ltd [1997] 1 WLR 1309 it was legitimate
to exercise the power in a case where not only the name of the tortfeasor
but the full nature of the suspected tort was unknown; but here Interbrew
know enough to be able to show the court that they have been wronged. The
decision of Neuberger J in Murphy v Murphy [1999] 1 WLR 282 intelligibly
extends the principle from the identification of persons answerable for wrongdoing
in which the applicant has an interest to the identification of trustees answerable
for the management of funds in which the applicant has an interest. But that
is all. Neither opens the door to a roving commission of inquiry into the
authorship of crimes.
Has
an entitlement to delivery up been established?
- Interbrew must
therefore establish that each defendant has facilitated a civil wrong committed
by an unknown person against whom they aim to seek redress. This, in agreement
with Lightman J, I consider they have succeeded in doing, though not without
some effective opposition.
- Mr Hollander
submits that on the evidence before the court the source has committed against
Interbrew at least the actionable wrong of breach of confidence. He is also
liable to them (it is argued) for malicious falsehood and unlawful interference
with Interbrew's economic interests. If he worked with others he is liable
civilly for conspiracy to injure. If he worked for Interbrew he is liable
for breach of contract.
- Working backwards
through this litany of wrongs, there is no evidence that the source was employed
by Interbrew and much to suggest that he was not. There is no evidence that
more than one person was involved, and nothing therefore to indicate a conspiracy.
Malicious falsehood and interference with economic interests require proof
of damage in order to establish a tort, and I accept Mr Tugendhat's submission
that any such damage, on the evidence and findings outlined above, is entirely
speculative. Interbrew cannot on the one hand assert that they were engaged
in no more than routine monitoring and on the other simultaneously assert
that their takeover bid has been thwarted; and even if they could, proof of
consequential loss would still be a long way off. This is apart from the question,
to which I will come, of establishing that a material part of the document
is false.
- That leaves
breach of confidence. The source has passed on information which he must have
known was confidential. But, Mr Tugendhat submits, this is only the beginning.
First of all, Interbrew's own case is that critical parts of the document
were false, and there can be no confidentiality in false information. This
Mr Hollander accepts. As to the rest, Mr Tugendhat submits that any confidentiality
evaporated when Mr Powell, on the record and without qualification, spoke
to the Financial Times – the first disseminator – about the document and admitted
that research had been done, albeit routinely, on South African Breweries.
This I do not accept. In particular I do not accept the contention that it
was up to Mr Powell to assert confidentiality. Financial journalists of the
calibre of those employed by these defendants were not born yesterday. They
had in their hands an apparently authentic document about an impending bid
by one of the world's largest brewing conglomerates for a coveted company,
delivered anonymously and disclosing things that Interbrew and its advisers
plainly needed to keep secret. Mr Powell's options when he learnt from Goldman
Sachs that the FT had the document were therefore pretty limited. If he said
and did nothing, the story would run in full. If he spoke off the record there
would still be nothing to contradict it. By going on the record to accept
routine market-watching but to deny any concrete plans, he was trying intelligibly
to limit the harm; but all he achieved, and all he could probably in retrospect
have hoped to achieve, was publication of his denial alongside the full story.
I see no possible case of waiver or acquiescence here, unless it is to be
the law that the victim of a leak is damned if he speaks to the media and
damned if he does not.
- To this relatively
modest extent, therefore, I agree with Lightman J that a breach of confidence
is made out. What is not in my view made out is the bigger and better cause
of action in respect of the "lethal cocktail" of fact and falsehood, since
the element of falsehood can neither form part of the protected confidence
nor stand on its own as a discrete tort. Nor, it seems to me, is it material
to the Norwich Pharmacal jurisdiction that Interbrew will be able to
dismiss the source, if they find him or her within their organisation, for
misconduct in falsifying as well as leaking documents. That is well within
the ambit of the interests of justice on the broad interpretation of s.10
if and when one reaches it; but for the same reasons as are set out above
in relation to the detection of crime, it can have no place in the jurisdiction
to require disclosure in support of a cause of action.
- From this point
on I agree with Mr Hollander that each defendant, by disseminating the leaked
information, has innocently lent itself to the wrongful purpose. None is a
mere bystander or witness. All, not solely (as Mr Tugendhat submits) the Financial
Times, disseminated the disclosure. It is unnecessary in these circumstances
to consider Mr Hollander's unpromising submission that Interbrew would be
entitled to an order for delivery up even if the defendants had published
nothing. If he were right, there would be a built-in incentive to publish
regardless, for which enterprises like Interbrew would not, I suspect, be
grateful.
Is
entitlement to production blocked by s.10?
- The purpose
of s.10 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 is to limit to the necessary minimum
any requirement upon journalists to reveal their sources. It has now to be
read and applied by our courts, so far as possible, compatibly with the Convention
rights: Human Rights Act 1998, s.3(1). For reasons touched on earlier in this
judgment, there should be no difficulty about this; but that is not to say
that the Convention can simply be treated as background, for it and its jurisprudence
may both amplify and modify the hitherto accepted meaning and effect of s.10.
For present purposes the Convention right which is in play is the qualified
right spelt out in art. 10. Mr Tugendhat's late invocation of art. 8 seems
to me to be a right too far: the right to respect for their correspondence
(which is what I take him to have had in mind) is qualified by a power of
interference so long as this is regulated by law and proportionately deployed
for the protection of the rights of others. That is exactly what s.10, mediated
through art.10, sets out to gauge, and it does not seem to me to help the
argument if one adds to the major right of free expression, which is clearly
in play, the ancillary right (as it is in the present context) to respect
for one's correspondence.
- Taking the interests
of justice to have the meaning adopted in Morgan-Grampian, and allowing
Mr Tugendhat to reserve, if not the argument, at least the hope that the narrower
view taken in Guardian Newspapers is to be preferred, we reach the
paradox that while the prevention of crime cannot ordinarily found a right
to disclosure, once the right is separately established the prevention of
crime becomes – it appears – a ground on which the protection of journalists'
sources can be defeated: becomes, in other words, a ground of disclosure.
In point of law Parliament's words are clear and Interbrew is entitled to
the benefit of them. Whether the benefit is real in point of fact, however,
will have to be considered below.
- The issue for
us, therefore, since the question is one of law, is whether it is necessary
in the interests of justice or for the prevention of crime to breach the confidentiality
of sources which the law otherwise protects. It is, I think, uncontroversial
that the effect of ss. 2 and 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 is to require
our judgment to conform so far as possible to the requirements of art.10,
and to take into account the Court's jurisprudence in determining what those
requirements are. This must mean that, to be necessary within what is now
the meaning of s.10, disclosure must meet a pressing social need, must be
the only practical way of doing so, must be accompanied by safeguards against
abuse and must not be such as to destroy the essence of the primary right:
see Clayton and Tomlinson, The Law of Human Rights (2000) paras. 6.43-47
and the cases there cited. To the extent that these criteria refine the s.10
test of what is necessary and highlight the need for a methodical approach
to it, they may go beyond the approach taken by the House of Lords in In
re an Inquiry [1988] AC 660, 704, where Lord Griffiths confined his construction
of the word to the lexicographical range of meanings, leaving the rest to
the judge of fact. As Laws LJ indicated in Ashworth (cited above),
it is an unvarying premise that it is prima facie contrary to the public interest
for press sources to be disclosed; and the debate which follows must today
be whether in a given case there is "an overriding public interest, amounting
to a pressing social need" to which the need for confidentiality should give
way. This vocabulary reflects that of the European Court of Human Rights in
Goodwin (above; see especially para. 39).
- For all this,
I would not necessarily endorse Mr Tugendhat's critique of Lightman J for
having described the s.10 shield in terms of a rebuttable presumption. What
matters in this as in all cases is not how the mechanism is described but
how it is operated.
- What Lightman
J said was this:
"Whilst
the privilege and presumption in favour of refusing relief subsists notwithstanding
the clear purpose behind the Source's communications with the Defendants,
the strength of the presumption is substantially weakened and its rebuttal
greatly eased by the facts that: (a) the Source has sought to deceive and
manipulate the press to achieve his criminal objective, namely to rig the
market; (b) the Source obtained from the Defendants no express promise of
confidentiality from any of the Defendants and [c] no such obligation could
reasonably be implied on the special facts of this case from his conduct in
sending the Doctored Copies to the Defendants (and others) to achieve his
nefarious object.
The
important principle that the public perception that the press will in any
ordinary circumstances keep confidential its sources cannot sustain any real
or serious damage where it is encroached upon in the exceptional circumstances
of this case. No fair minded observer could reasonably take the view that
a person acting as the Source has in this case would be protected from identification
by press privilege. Indeed it might be thought to bring the privilege into
disrepute and be an affront to justice and common sense if it was to be available
to preclude the pursuit of enquiries necessary to prevent a repetition of
this fraud on the public."
- It seems to
me, with great respect, that of the judge's three particular reasons for withdrawing
the shield, the second and third are not tenable and the first is, at lowest,
controversial. I will explain why.
The
interests of justice
- The interests
of justice are the more obvious s.10 ground for removing the shield. They
include both the bringing of proceedings by Interbrew against the source and
their exercise of any legal rights they may possess against him. They do not
include the prevention of crime, since the prevention of crime is a separate
ground in s.10. But the detection of crime, which is not separately spelt
out, is paradigmatically in the interests of justice. Does it not follow that
once a claimant has passed through the Norwich Pharmacal door by establishing
a civil cause of action, it may enlarge its claim on the identity of the source
by contending that disclosure will assist in the detection of crime?
- I do not think
it does follow. Section 10, as I have said, does not create either a freestanding
privilege from disclosure or a freestanding withdrawal of the privilege in
specified conditions. It assumes the existence of a prima facie right to disclosure
and qualifies it in strictly limited terms, requiring a value judgment to
be formed in every case. Absent an initial right, s.10 has no bearing. If
this is a correct analysis of it, it seems to me to follow that an initial
right to disclosure for one purpose does not necessarily allow the statutory
privilege which protects journalistic sources to be abrogated for a different
purpose. The point can perhaps be illustrated by considering the exception
in s.10 in favour of national security. A newspaper publishes a story from
a confidential source, believed by it to be completely reliable, which alleges
A to be British spy. A, considering himself defamed and wanting to prevent
the source from disseminating further libels on him, brings Norwich Pharmacal
proceedings. The newspaper invokes s.10. Can A argue that it is in the interests
of national security to trace the source, since the source is likely to be
within the security services? Or must that be for the Attorney General if,
and only if, he decides to bring his own proceedings to trace and discipline
the source as a threat to national security? The latter seems right. On the
other hand, it is harder to say that a company trying to trace an insider
who is feeding information to anarchists planning to disrupt its operations
cannot rely on the s.10 exception for the prevention of disorder. For such
reasons as these, as well as because of the plain language of s.10, there
cannot be a simple rule confining the available grounds for abrogating the
privilege to those which found the initial right to disclosure. But there
is an undoubted problem in the apparent availability of an armoury of fresh
weapons to any claimant able to find the key to the Norwich Pharmacal
door.
- The solution,
in my view, is in the pivotal word "necessary". Read, as it must now be read,
in the light of the Convention and its jurisprudence, it requires close regard
to be had to the relationship between the mischief and the measure. If the
mischief is a civil wrong, the measure which needs to be justified as relevant
and proportionate is one which will right the wrong. In the present case,
that will mean a measure in the interests of civil justice, not – except peripherally
– for the detection of crime. The latter is a matter for the FSA with its
quite different statutory powers. I have accepted that the language of s.10
does not make it possible – and its purpose does not always make it desirable
– to shut out other listed grounds of abrogation of the privilege; but the
effect of the Human Rights Act and the Convention is to place the focus on
the statutory analogue of the ground established for disclosure.
The
prevention of crime
- This reasoning,
if it is right, deals equally with the place of the s.10 exception for the
prevention of crime. If Interbrew can show that the source has committed or
been party to a crime of market manipulation and is likely to do so again
unless caught, it will not be irrelevant to the present claim; but neither
will it be a freestanding ground for abrogating the s.10 privilege. In
re an Inquiry [1988] AC 660, 704-5 (an example of the class of case where
the prevention of crime exception is pivotal because it mirrors the ground
of the application) makes it clear that the prevention of crime under s.10
can go much wider than simply preventing repetition, but Interbrew do not
need it to do so.
Forgery
and market manipulation
- Everything proceeded
below on the assumption that crimes of forgery and market manipulation were
proved. But both, or at least the former, depend upon the falsity of the pages
in the document showing bid price and timetable. False they were if one goes
on such evidence as was before the court. But by definition their falsity
is alleged against an absent and silent accused. We have no way of knowing,
any more than – as Mr Tugendhat stressed – the five defendants do, whether
the source, if cornered, would demonstrate that he had simply assembled authentic
documents from different places within Interbrew, GS and Lazards.
- I have to say
that I find this aspect of the Norwich Pharmacal procedure troubling.
A commercial enterprise which may very well have its own reasons for denying
the authenticity of a document gets a clear run against a media defendant
which can only, save in rare cases, take a neutral stand on the question.
The court of first instance needs to be extremely circumspect before accepting
evidence, especially when, as here, it is second- or third-hand, that goes
to the heart of the case and cannot be controverted. I would not be prepared
to accept Mr Tugendhat's submission that even the source of a lie, and one
knowingly published, would rank for protection under s.10 – at least not in
practice; but he is entitled to draw attention to the one-sidedness of the
evidence about whether what has been published is a lie.
The
source's motive and purpose.
- The source may
have had many possible motives for leaking information. He or she may also
have had more than one purpose in mind. Mr Tugendhat's grounds of appeal argued
that the latter is irrelevant; but, as he accepted in argument, it is motive
rather than purpose which needs to be excluded. Not only is motive ordinarily
pure guesswork in the absence of the source; it is immaterial to the legal
issues. Indeed, if Laws LJ is right in Ashworth (cited above), there
is in the chilling effect of disclosure orders an affirmative policy reason
for ignoring motive in individual cases. The purpose of the leak, by
contrast, is likely to be highly material. If it is to bring wrongdoing to
public notice it will deserve a high degree of protection, and it will not
matter – assuming that it could anyway be ascertained - whether the motive
is conscience or spite. If the purpose is to wreck legitimate commercial activity,
again it will not matter whether it is done for political motives or personal
gain: it will be the less deserving of protection. For these reasons the court
of first instance, while not speculating about motive, needs to form the best
view it can of the source's purpose. To this extent I would not, with respect,
agree with the view of Laws LJ (ante) that it is of no consequence that the
information may be of no legitimate objective public interest, or that it
is contrary to the court's proper purposes to create a chilling effect in
relation to such material. If – as ex hypothesi will be the case – a primary
entitlement to disclosure and a s.10 ground for overriding the privilege have
both been established, the presence or absence of an overriding public interest
in disclosure of the source cannot surely be the same whether the information
is of real public importance or, say, merely prurient. Where a case for overriding
the privilege against disclosure is made out, the consequent chilling effect,
as Lord Phillips MR said in Ashworth, may be no bad thing.
The
promise of confidentiality
- What in my judgment
can never matter is whether the promise of confidentiality is explicit or
implicit. To prioritise an express over an implied promise might well be to
give the knowing and artful source better protection than the frightened and
elusive source, for to give an express promise the journalist has ordinarily
to know either who the source is or how to find him or her. Mr Hollander's
submission to the contrary seems to me a recipe for injustice. On the other
hand – although it does not arise here – I do not think Mr Tugendhat can have
the penny and the bun by arguing, as he goes on to do, that an express promise
of confidentiality may be relevant. If the circumstances are not such as to
bring the public interest in anonymity of sources into play, I do not see
how a promise can bridge the gap; and once the interest is in play, I do not
see how it can be enhanced by a promise, nor (for reasons I have given) why
it should be able to be. I say that the issue does not arise here because
I do not accept that the assertion of the Independent's managing editor that
the document was received by the paper's journalists "subject to a clear understanding
that they would not reveal the source of the material held by them" is more
than a description of the implied terms on which all such material is received.
Is
there a discretion under s.10
- Perhaps the
hardest of all the questions is whether, and if so in what measure, the court
has a discretion to exercise under s.10.
- I have no difficulty
in concluding that the central exercise is not in any true sense one of discretion.
Deciding whether disclosure is necessary for one of the listed purposes is
a matter of hard-edged judgment, albeit one of both fact and law, and none
the less so for having to respect the principles of proportionality. To this
extent I respectfully accept that Lightman J erred when, in refusing permission
to appeal, he wrote: "The decision is, or involves, an exercise of discretion".
- Mr Hollander
has devoted the second half of his skeleton argument to the proposition that
the final balancing exercise is an exercise of discretion. For authority
he relies on what Lord Phillips MR said in paragraphs 91-2 in Ashworth.
But those paragraphs, cited earlier in this judgment, have to be read
in the context of the one which precedes them. As I understand his reasoning,
the Master of the Rolls is saying no more than that, accepting for the sake
of argument that this is how the reasoning process can be characterised, it
does not differ in practice from the approach of the European Court of Human
Rights.
- For my part,
I can see every reason for not holding that the rigorous approach to necessity
which the Convention requires in this context is equivalent to, say, a decision
as to where the balance of convenience lies on an application for an interlocutory
injunction. Discretion is exercised where the court has to make a choice between
two or more legitimate courses. On both Strasbourg and domestic authority,
by contrast, the question which arises under s.10 is what the legitimate course
is: is there a lawful aim? is disclosure necessary to achieve it? will disclosure
destroy the essence of the protected right? and if not, does its importance
outweigh the public interest in protecting journalists' sources? To each of
these questions, once the facts are found, there can in law be only one answer.
As Lord Griffiths said in In re an Inquiry (above) at 704, "whether
a particular measure is necessary, although described as a question of fact
for the purpose of s.10, involves the exercise of a judgment upon the established
facts". His next remark, that "[i]n the exercise of that judgment different
people may come to different conclusions on the same facts", does not reduce
the exercise to one of discretion. As Lord Bridge was later to explain in
X v Morgan-Grampian (above, at 44):
"Whether
the necessity of disclosure in this sense is established is certainly a question
of fact rather than an issue calling for the exercise of the judge's discretion,
but, like many other questions of fact, such as the question whether somebody
has acted reasonably in given circumstances, it will call for the exercise
of a discriminating and sometimes difficult value judgment. In estimating
the weight to be attached to the importance of disclosure in the interests
of justice on the one hand and that of protection from disclosure in pursuance
of the policy which underlies section 10 on the other hand, many factors will
be relevant on both sides of the scale."
I
have given earlier in this judgment my reasons for thinking that the effect
of ss. 2 and 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 has been to move the evaluation
of necessity further towards the status of a question of law, albeit one which
is still heavily fact-dependant and value-laden.
48. This
is why the judge was wrong, in my respectful view, to say that his decision
was an exercise of discretion. But it must not be forgotten that to establish
the factors required by s.10 to override confidentiality is to do no more
than restore the jurisdiction initially invoked in order to obtain an order
for disclosure. If within this jurisdiction there are distinct grounds, such
as unclean hands or delay, for refusing an order, the judge in his discretion
can refuse it. The s.10 bar will have been lifted, but other, discretionary,
bars may still operate. To this extent Lightman J was therefore right to say
that the court's judgment involved an exercise of discretion; but not
materially to the present case.
Conclusions
49. In
the light of the foregoing I have come to the conclusion, though not without
misgiving, that the order for disclosure was rightly made against all the
defendants. Nothing which has been put before us suggests that the court will
be significantly better placed at an eventual trial than it is now to decide
the key issues; and there is at least some force in Interbrew's complaint
that its hands are tied vis-à-vis South African Breweries, and possibly
other targets too, unless and until it can prevent a recurrence of this spoiling
operation.
- For
the reasons given earlier in this judgment, Interbrew's prima facie entitlement
to delivery up of the documents is established because – and solely because
– it may enable them to ascertain the identity of the proper defendant to
a breach of confidence action relating to the relatively anodyne, though not
the explosive, parts of the document. From the sweep of Interbrew's original
case and the "lethal cocktail" on which Lightman J founded his conclusions,
the basis of the application now shrinks to this little measure. But though
little, it is far from insignificant for Interbrew.
- With it, one
turns to s.10 of the 1981 Act. The section begins by barring any order for
disclosure in circumstances such as these, since its very object is to discover
the source of information which the defendants have published. Interbrew,
however, can invoke one of the listed purposes for lifting the bar: that disclosure
is necessary in the interests of justice. That it may also go to the prevention
of crime cannot be ruled out as irrelevant, but it is peripheral because it
is not a purpose for which Interbrew themselves are entitled to disclosure.
Then is the public interest in the doing of justice sufficient in the particular
circumstances of this case to make disclosure necessary? Reading that question
through the lens of the Convention and its jurisprudence, as we are now required
to do, the following elements separate themselves out.