Minimum terms
High Court setting of minimum terms for mandatory life sentences under the Criminal Justice Act 2003
Case No: MTR/393/2004
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
27th July 2005
Before :
MR JUSTICE TUGENDHAT
Between :
Regina
V
JAMES ROBERTSON ANDERSON
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Judgment
As Approved by the Court
1. I have considered the application of James Anderson under Schedule 22 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. I take the facts of the case from the trial judge’s report dated 31st March 1992 and the medical report enclosed wit the judge’s report. Representations have been made by his wife and by himself, but by no one else. Both state that he has been a well trusted and well mannered prisoner, and done all that he has been required to do.
2. James Anderson struck the victim over the head causing many abrasions and considerable blood loss. He then strangled her with a ligature and after she was dead he opened her body from sternum to the pubic bone with an electric carving knife. She was his step mother. The murder was at night. Both had been drinking heavily that day. He was 43 at the time.
3. Murder is always an offence of the utmost gravity, but there are nevertheless some offences of murder that are more serious than others. The principles by which the seriousness of a murder is to be measured are set out in the 2003 Act, including in Sch 21, para 4. Sch 22 para 4(2) requires me to have regard to these principles, and I shall proceed to consider the ones relevant to this case.
4. There are no factors which bring the case within the categories of offence of which the seriousness is exceptionally high as provided for in Sch 21 para 4. But the mutilation of the body is, as the trial said a disturbing and unusual feature. Since he denied the murder, and denied any sexual relationship with the victim, it is uncertain how this should be regarded. It may be sexual or sadistic conduct of the kind referred to in para 5(2)(e) of Sch 21, but I shall treat it as an aggravating feature within para 10(g) (dismemberment of the body).
5. Accordingly, this is a case where, if he were sentenced under the 2003 Act, the starting point would be 15 years.
6. I have mentioned that the dismemberment of the body is an aggravating feature, and it is the only one within para 10 of Sch 21.
7. It appears the murder was not premeditated, which is a mitigating factor which I take into account in accordance with para 11(b) of Sch 21. But the medical report indicated no mental illness or disturbance, and there is no other mitigation within that paragraph.
8. Since the defence was alibi, James Anderson did not explain the circumstances of the murder at the trial. The trial judge considered that the mutilation suggested an element of dangerousness. I agree.
9. The trial recommended 12 – 14 years as the period of detention necessary to meet the requirements of retribution and general deterrence. The Lord Chief Justice recommended 12 years. On 5th September 1994 the Secretary of State notified him that the terms would be 14 years, being the period to be served that he considered necessary to satisfy the requirements of retribution and deterrence.
10. If the sentence fell to be imposed under the 2003 Act, the presence of both aggravating and mitigating factors would, taken together, have resulted in the minimum term being set at 15 years.
11. Schedule 22 para 3 provides that the sentence that is specified in the order made on this application must not be greater than the term notified on behalf of the Secretary of State.
12. I have had regard to all of the above matters. I have also considered the guidance given by Lord Bingham CJ on 10th February 1997 and in other guidance since then.
13. There is nothing in any of these matters or in any of the guidance to lead me to conclude that the total period of custody served should be less than that which has already been notified to James Anderson.
14. I am also required by Sch 22 para 4(1)(b) of the 2003 Act to have regard to the effect of s.67 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967. I am satisfied that if James Anderson had been sentenced to a term of imprisonment the length of his sentence would have been treated as being reduced by that provision by the period of his remand in custody. There is no reason why this should not be deducted from what would otherwise be his minimum term.
15. It is for these reasons I have decided that the provisions of section 28(5) to (8) of the Crime (Sentences) Act (the early release provisions) are to apply to James Anderson as soon as he has served 12 years imprisonment less the period of his remand in custody which was 11 months and 7 days.