Minimum terms
High Court setting of minimum terms for mandatory life sentences under the Criminal Justice Act 2003
MTS/341/2004
Neutral Citation Number: [2005] EWHC 2697 (QB)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand
London WC2
Friday,28 October 2005
B E F O R E:
MR JUSTICE COOKE
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A DECISION UPON AN APPLICATION UNDER PARAGRAPH 3 OF SCHEDULE 22 TO THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT 2003
REGINA
-v-
WASIM AHMED
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J U D G M E N T
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1. MR JUSTICE COOKE: This is an application for a minimum term to be set in relation to a mandatory life sentence which I passed on the applicant Wasim Ahmed.
2. The Applicant was convicted on 29th April 2002 and sentenced to a mandatory term of life imprisonment on 30th April 2002 for the murder of a young man called Dulal on 28th August 2001. The Applicant went armed to a situation where he suspected a fight would occur as a result of previous altercations. He had no reason to believe that weapons would be used by the other faction, even if they did envisage retaliation in respect of earlier events, as he feared. The Applicant did not, in my judgment, go to the scene with the express intention of killing Dulal, or anyone else, but became incensed by the attack on his brother which caused him to leave his car, pull out a knife and a plank. By the time he arrived on the scene there was no continuing threat to his brother and his reaction was disproportionate in engaging in a fight. When the plank broke he resorted to the knife and stabbed Dulal in his effort to escape the latter's restraint of him. Although there was no deep thought or concerted premeditation, the use of the knife in plunging it twice into the victim's chest speaks for itself. There was very limited non-technical provocation in the events of that night in the form of the limited attack on his brother, but the Applicant bore responsibility for the events of the previous night which triggered that retaliation and he went armed on the evening in question. That and the use of the knife militate against any suggestion of spontaneity and the intention was plainly to cause serious harm.
3. This is a case to which the transitional provisions of Schedule 22 of the Criminal Justice Act apply, where I have to set a minimum term which should be served before the Applicant's release on licence. Having taken into account the seriousness of this offence, I do not consider that it is so exceptionally serious that paragraph 4 of Schedule 21 to the 2003 Act applies. This is therefore a case within section 269(2) of that Act and the early release provisions set out in statute will apply to the Applicant as soon as he has served that part of his life sentence which is specified in this order.
4. Section 269 of the Act and Paragraph 4 of Schedule 22 require me to take account of the seriousness of the offence and the time spent on remand when considering this application. I have also, when considering the seriousness of the offence, to take account of the general principles set out in Schedule 21 to the Act and any guidelines relating to offences in general which are relevant and not incompatible with the provisions of that Schedule, together with the recommendations made to the Secretary of State by me as the trial judge and the recommendations of the Lord Chief Justice.
5. Furthermore, the specified term which I order to be served before the early release provisions apply is not to be longer than that which, under the practice followed by the Secretary of State before December 2002, would, in my opinion, have been the term notified by the Secretary of State as the period before which the Applicant would not be eligible for consideration for such release.
6. The Applicant was aged 25 at the time of the offence. The offence does not in my judgment fall into either of the categories constituted by paragraph 4(1) or 5(1) of Schedule 21 and therefore the appropriate starting point for determining the minimum term is 15 years in accordance with paragraph 6 of that Schedule.
7. I then have to take into account any aggravating or mitigating factors, bearing in mind those set out in the Schedule and particularly those set out in paragraphs 10 and 11. There was a degree of planning inasmuch as the Applicant went armed in case of trouble. He reacted to the punch thrown at his brother in retaliation for the previous night and then intervened with a plank and then a knife, when the protagonists had already been separated. These are aggravating factors. Although he feared for the safety of his brother and himself from those with whom they had fought the previous night (largely at his instigation) and perhaps feared that others might assist, there was no need for a weapon, nor any need to intervene at all by the time he arrived on the scene. His intention in using the knife was at least to cause serious harm at that moment. I take account of the Applicant's age of 25 and his subsequent remorse, after fleeing the scene and eventually handing himself in, 33 hours later. Applying the guidelines today from the starting point of 15 years would, in my judgment, balancing these factors, result in a minimum term of 15 years.
8. The Applicant spent one month and ten days on remand in custody. This falls to be deducted from the 15-year period and results in a period of 14 years, 10 months and 20 days.
9. In my judgment however, the Secretary of State would not have been likely to set such a tariff had the matter been referred to him under the practice previously followed before the Act and I cannot set a specified period higher than that. The starting point set by the Practice Statement (Crime: Life Sentences) [2002] 1 WLR 1789 was 12 years for a crime such as this. The factors which were then to be taken into account were essentially the same as those to which I have already referred. In my judgment, by reason of the balance of the aggravating and mitigating factors to which I have referred, the period that would have been set would have been 12 years, which was both my recommendation and that of the Lord Chief Justice shortly after sentence.
10. The specified part of the life sentence which is to be served before the statutory early release provisions are to apply is therefore 12 years.