Minimum terms
High Court setting of minimum terms for mandatory life sentences under the Criminal Justice Act 2003
Case No: MTR / 1120 / 2004
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
BIRMINGHAM CROWN COURT
Date: 7TH FEBRUARY 2006
Before:
MR JUSTICE GIBBS
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Between:
Regina
-v-
Michael Jason Allen
Approved Judgment
I direct that pursuant to CPR PD 39A para 6.1 no official shorthand note shall be taken of this Judgment and that copies of this version as handed down may be treated as authentic.
.............................
THE HON.MR JUSTICE GIBBS
1. On 10th July 1995 at the Central Criminal Court the applicant Michael Jason Allen was sentenced to life imprisonment by His Honour Judge Gordon after a trial. The trial judge recommended a minimum term of at least 12 years as necessary to meet the requirements of retribution and general deterrence. On 13th July 1995 Lord Taylor, then Chief Justice, agreed with the recommendation. On 8th May 1996 having considered representations from the applicant’s counsel regarding the minimum term, the Home secretary notified to the applicant a minimum term of 12 years.
2. Pursuant to the provisions of Schedule 22(3) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, the
Applicant has applied to the High Court for the tariff set by the Home Secretary to be reviewed. In reviewing the term, I have had regard to the representations made on behalf of the applicant on 24th January 1996, and representations made in support of this application received by the Life Imprisonment Minimum Term Section on 14th March 2005. I have also read two Victim Personal Statements from members of the deceased’s family.
3. Pursuant to section 269 of the Act and to Schedule 22(3) and (4), in considering the seriousness of the offences, I have had regard to the general principles set out in
Schedule 21 and the recommendations made both by the trial judge and the Lord Chief Justice. I have also had regard to the notified minimum term and to the provisions of section 67 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967 relating to the time spent in custody on remand.
4. The facts of the case are as follows. The victim was a seventeen year old girl called Cara Hepworth. Her body was found at 8.45 am on 14th May 1994 in the front garden
of a house bordering the road which would have been her route home the previous night. Her tights and pants had been removed; her skirt was pulled up; her bra had been removed with one breast exposed and her pubic hair and the front of her dress had been singed. Fifty-five bruises and abrasions were found on her body. She had died from a compound fracture of the skull, compound fractures to her facial bones and a fracture of the hyoid bone. These were caused by repeated pounding of her head against an edged surface (thought to be the raised edge of a nearby driveway) and by stamping on her head. No semen was found and there were no vaginal injuries.
5. The defendant’s case had been that he had met the victim by chance in the street the previous evening; they had walked together, there had been some consensual sexual
activity, but they had then parted and someone else must have committed the crime.
6. The defendant has ever since maintained that he did not commit the offence. He has however made good progress in prison and completed successfully a number of appropriate programmes whilst in custody.
7. Applying Schedule 21 of the 2003 Act, it is arguable that the seriousness of the offence was particularly high so as to justify an appropriate starting point of 30 years under paragraph 5. The reason is that the applicant was born on 8th March 1973 and was therefore 18 or over when the offence was committed; and the murder involved sexual or sadistic conduct (paragraph 5(2)(e). In my judgment it is plain from the facts summarised at paragraph 4 above that the murder was the result of a sexually motivated attack carried out with extreme brutality and in circumstances which sexually humiliated the victim.
8. However, it would be wrong in principle to apply today’s standards as reflected by the provisions of the 2003 Act. In any event, pursuant to Schedule 22(3)(1)(a) of the 2003 Act, the High Court cannot increase the minimum term notified by the Home Secretary. It is in my judgment necessary to examine the appropriate minimum term in the light of the principles applicable at the time of the sentence and recommendations. These principles are best to be discerned from the guidance provided for sentencing judges in the letter dated 10th February 1997 from Lord Bingham, then Lord Chief Justice. These would have provided for a starting point, on the facts of this case, of 14 years. See Amendment No. 8 to the Consolidated Criminal Practice Direction (Mandatory Life Sentences) IV.49.18. None of the mitigating factors exemplified by Lord Bingham applied. One of the aggravating factors applied, namely, evidence of gratuitous violence, sexual maltreatment and humiliation (49.19). Therefore the application of the relevant principles enunciated by Lord Bingham would in my judgment have resulted in a minimum term of more than 14 years.
9. In the light of this analysis of the law as set out in the 2003 Act, and with reference to the guidance set out by Lord Bingham referred to above, it seems to me that the minimum term in relation to this applicant cannot possibly be criticised as being excessive. It is unnecessary for me to determine whether or not it might be described as lenient, since I am prohibited by law from increasing it. I have considered the applicant’s good progress whilst in prison, a matter which may fall to be considered if or when he applies for early release. It is not however a matter which in my view is of sufficient weight to justify a reduction in the tariff in the present case.
10. Finally, I need to spell out the effect of section 67 of the 1967 Act, which requires the time spent by the applicant in custody on remand to be taken into account. This was 13 months and 2 days. That period has to be deducted from the minimum sentence, which accordingly falls to be determined as 10 years 10 months and 28 days from the date of sentence.