Minimum terms
High Court setting of minimum terms for mandatory life sentences under the Criminal Justice Act 2003
Case No: 2008/6/MTR
Neutral Citation Number: [2009] EWHC 24[QB]
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN’S BENCH DIVISION
Winchester Crown Court
Date: Friday 23rd January 2009
Before:
THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE BUTTERFIELD
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Between:
Regina
V
Geoffrey Arthur Austin
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JUDGMENT
Mr Justice Butterfield:
1. On 4th November 1997 at the Crown Court at Lincoln before HHJ Hutchinson and a jury the Applicant, Geoffrey Arthur Austin, who is now 64 years of age and of hitherto good character, was convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. The trial Judge recommended that he serve a minimum term of 14 years. The Lord Chief Justice considered that a term of 13-14 years would be appropriate.
2. On 18th September 2000 the Secretary of State informed the Applicant that his tariff had been set at 14 years. The Applicant’s case has been referred to me for the making of an order under Section 269 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 in relation to the mandatory life sentence.
3. In determining the appropriate minimum period to be served by the Applicant I have directed myself by reference to the provisions of Schedule 22 to the 2003 Act and in particular paragraphs 5-8. In assessing the seriousness of the offence I am required to have regard to the general principles set out in Schedule 21 and to the recommendation made by the trial Judge and the Lord Chief Justice as to the minimum term to be served.
4. The victim of the murder was the Applicant’s wife. She had left him and was living separately in a house in Lincoln. She had formed a relationship with another man. This greatly distressed the Applicant. On Sunday 3rd November 1996 the Applicant had an emotional meeting with his wife at her house during which she refused his pleas to return to him and made it clear that the marriage was over. On the evening of Tuesday, 5th November 1996 the Applicant armed himself with a knife, returned to his wife’s home and there murdered her. The attack leading to her death was sustained, brutal and savage. The Applicant stabbed his wife 17 times. He inflicted 11 wounds which penetrated her chest cavity and 3 which penetrated her abdominal cavity. In addition she received a violent blow to the throat which caused 5 fractures to the larynx.
5. The Applicant maintained that he was not the killer, so that the sole issue at trial was identity. The Applicant maintains his innocence and still hopes to appeal successfully against his conviction.
6. The Judge, having presided over the trial for about 2 weeks, was satisfied that the murder was to some extent premeditated. In the light of the fact that the Applicant went to his wife’s home when he knew that she was not prepared to consider any reconciliation and did so armed with a knife entirely supports that conclusion.
7. Representations submitted on behalf of the Applicant suggest that there was no evidence that the events leading to the murder were anything other than spontaneous: as to that, in my judgment there was evidence, which the trial Judge plainly accepted, to the contrary affect. The representations also point to the Applicant’s excellent custodial behaviour, his positive attitude towards work, and his assistance to another prisoner who suffered some form of seizure and to whom the Applicant administered prompt and potentially life-saving first aid.
8. The family of the victim have made no representations, nor have the Crown Prosecution Service. There has been no request for an oral hearing and I do not consider such a hearing to be necessary.
9. In terms of Schedule 21 this offence is one to which the 15 year starting point provided in paragraph 6 would apply. There are no statutory mitigating or aggravating factors though there was, in my judgment, some degree of planning and premeditation. If I was imposing a minimum term now, having regard to the nature and extent of the fatal attack and the degree of premeditation involved I consider that the appropriate period would be one of 17 years.
10. In order to comply with Article 7 the term set under Section 269 must not be greater than that which the Secretary of State for the Home Department in fact sets.
11. I am not persuaded that the progress made by the Applicant whilst in custody, satisfactory though it undoubtedly is, is of such an exceptional nature as to justify a reduction in his tariff. He has undergone a number of courses and sought to make the most of his time in prison. It must be remembered, however, that had he not so conducted himself it is unlikely that the Parole Board would be prepared to direct his release even after he has served the tariff for this very serious offence.
12. Having regard to the factors I have identified and after carefully reconsidering the case I have concluded that the minimum term should be set at a period of 14 years. By virtue of paragraph 4(1)(b) of Schedule 22 account must also be taken of the time spent in custody on remand prior to sentence. In my judgment there is no reason why that time should not count towards the minimum period to be served by the applicant. Accordingly the specified period is one of 14 years less the period of 11 months 23 days spent in custody on remand.