Minimum terms
High Court setting of minimum terms for mandatory life sentences under the Criminal Justice Act 2003
Neutral Citation Number: [2008]EWHC 1121 (QB) Ref Number:2004/977/MTR
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEENS BENCH DIVISION
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
Date: 2/6/08
Before:
MR JUSTICE COULSON
JUDGMENT
IN THE MATTER OF COLIN BANBRIDGE
A. Introduction
1. This is an application under schedule 22 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. I have considered the written representation made on behalf of the applicant, Colin Banbridge, by way of a letter dated 16 January 2006 and received on 17 January. I have also read the applicant’s handwritten note of 24 April 2005, in which he maintains his innocence of the crime.
2. The applicant is an “existing prisoner” within the meaning of schedule 22. On 19th June 2000, he was convicted of murder and rape and was sentenced to life imprisonment. The trial Judge recommended a minimum period of 22 years. The Lord Chief Justice, Lord Woolf, recommended a period of 20 years. By a written notice dated 3rd August 2001, the applicant was notified by the Home Secretary, that the minimum period to be served before his release on licence was 24 years.
3. I have to decide whether I should order that the early release provisions under the 2003 Act should apply to him after a shorter period than 24 years. It is not open to me to order that they should apply after a longer period. In considering this application I must have regard to the seriousness of the offence of murder that the applicant committed, and in doing so, I must have regard to general principles set out in schedule 21 of the Act and also to the recommendations made to the Home Secretary by the trial Judge and the Lord Chief Justice, referred to above.
4. I am also to have regard to the effect that section 67 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967 would have had if the applicant had been sentenced to a tem of imprisonment, providing I am satisfied that, if he had been so sentenced, the length of his sentence would have been treated as reduced by a particular period under that section: therefore the court takes account of any period that a person has spent in custody only because he was committed to custody by an order of the court made in connection with proceedings relating to the murder. I am satisfied that here I should have regard to a period spent in custody on remand of 9 months and 10 days.
B The Offence
5. The applicant was born on 8th April 1965. In March 1999, the applicant was entrusted with the care of a 9 year old girl, Laura Kane, the daughter of a female friend. The applicant took her from her home, tied her up and raped her in such a violent manner that it caused enormous vaginal bruising and a tear to the lining of the vagina, which led to considerable bleeding.
6. Thereafter, in order to prevent detection, the applicant suffocated and killed Laura. He then covered up the crime and hid Laura’s body under the floorboards of his house. He then went to the pub with Laura’s mother that same night, saying nothing to her mother as she became more and more concerned about Laura’s safety. He gave no clue as to what had happened. The body was not found for 10 days. The Judge rightly regarded this behaviour as extraordinarily callous. The applicant denied his guilt and was subsequently convicted of Laura’s rape and murder.
C Seriousness/ The Criminal Justice Act 2003
7. Under paragraph 4 (2) of schedule 21 of the 2003 Act, the appropriate starting point for a murder of a child, if it involves the abduction of the child or a sexual motivation, is a whole life order. It is therefore arguable that a whole life order is the appropriate starting point in the case of the applicant. In any event, under paragraph 5 (2) of the same schedule, the starting point for any murder involving sexual conduct is 30 years. It seems to me that, at the very least, the 30 year starting point is the appropriate starting point for a consideration of the applicant’s minimum term.
8. At paragraph 10 of the schedule, there are a series of potential aggravating features. It is plain that a number of those features apply in this case. There is the vulnerability of the victim, who was only 9 at the time she was raped and murdered; the physical suffering inflicted on the victim before death, which was clearly extreme; the applicant’s abuse of a position of trust; and the concealment of Laura’s body. By contrast, the mitigating factors, which are those set out at page 2B- 2E of the trial Judge’s sentencing remarks, amount to little more than the applicant’s previous good character and absence of any prior abuse of children or other members of Laura’s family. The trial Judge rightly regarded them as not justifying any significant reduction in the tariff.
9. For the reasons set out above, I therefore take the view that, under the 2003 Act, the 24 year minimum term identified by the Home Secretary was entirely justified. Indeed, for the reasons I have noted, if it were open to me to do so, I would increase the 24 year minimum term.
10. It is, however, right to note that the applicant served 9 months and 10 days of that minimum term prior to sentence. I consider that allowance should be made for that period. No other allowance in respect of the minimum term can be appropriate in the applicant’s case.
D Practice in 1999-2000
11. The murder was committed in 1999 and the applicant was sentenced in 2000, when the practice adopted by the Home Secretary was stated in Lord Bingham’s letter to trail judges dated 10th February 1997. That fixed the starting point for the “average, normal or unexceptional” murder as 14 years. However the letter went on to identify various aggravating factors that would justify a more severe sentence, including the killing of a child, evidence of sexual maltreatment and attempts to conceal the body.
12. Each of the three aggravating factors noted above are applicable here, and would justify a significant increase over and above the 14 years. Accordingly, if a consideration of the applicant’s case requires a review of the correct approach under the regime laid down in Lord Bingham’s letter, (which I doubt, given the existence of the Home Secretary’s notification of 3rd August 2001), it can be seen that the 24 year minimum term is fully justified on that basis too.
E Other Matters
13. The applicant sought an oral hearing. Pursuant to the decision of the Divisional Court in Hammond [2004] EWHC (Admin) 2753, an oral hearing will only be granted in rare cases. There is absolutely nothing in the papers before me to indicate any particular circumstances which necessitate an oral hearing. The application for an oral hearing is therefore refused.
14. In my judgment, this was an appalling crime in respect of which the 24 year minimum term imposed was, if anything, too low. The only adjustment which is appropriate is the acknowledgment that the 9 months 10 days which the applicant spent on remand prior to conviction and sentence should count towards that 24 year minimum term.