Minimum terms
High Court setting of minimum terms for mandatory life sentences under the Criminal Justice Act 2003
Neutral Citation Number: [2008] EWHC 432 (QB)
Case No: 2006/49/MTR
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
Date: 19/03/2008
Before :
THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE MACKAY
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Between :
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ATIF MOHAMMED IKBAL
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Hearing dates: 4th – 10th June 1997
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Approved Judgment
I direct that pursuant to CPR PD 39A para 6.1 no official shorthand note shall be taken of this Judgment and that copies of this version as handed down may be treated as authentic.
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THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE MACKAY
Mr Justice Mackay:
1. This defendant is an existing prisoner who was convicted on 10 June 1997 of murdering Mohammad Ahmed Sardar (his uncle) and Mohammad Sardar (his cousin). He admitted killing the two men, but entered a defence of diminished responsibility which the jury rejected.
2. The trial judge recommended a tariff period of 20 years. The Lord Chief Justice recommended 18 years and the Secretary of State fixed the tariff at 18 years.
3. There had been a feud of many years' standing between the Ikbals and the Sardars. The defendant's father was the brother of Mohammad Ahmed Sardar. The defendant was therefore his nephew. The uncle had greatly prospered in his business affairs and owned numerous properties, including a large store in which the murders took place. The defendant's own father had not been successful over the years. The defendant himself however had achieved well, was of good character, and was a kick-boxer at an international level.
4. The immediate cause of the fatal shooting was an affront offered to the defendant's sister by the uncle. On hearing of this the defendant plainly decided to avenge his family's honour.
5. He obtained a sawn-off shotgun, from a source he has never revealed, and at least eight cartridges. His brother drove him to the uncle's shop where following a reconnaissance he entered the shop with the loaded gun just before closing time. He fired the gun so as to hit the uncle in the head as he ducked behind the counter. He then fired a second shot into the cheek of his cousin. He left the shop to reload and returned. He then fired two further shots into the recumbent body of his cousin. He reloaded again, leant over the counter and fired two more shots into his uncle's body. He then pursued two other younger Sardar brothers, making as if to shoot them, but was restrained by his own brother's appeals to leave. On leaving the shop he fired a further two or three shots at the windows. He later gave himself up to the police.
6. As the trial judge stated his conduct was “a tribute to the pressure exercised in his community by family honour”. The deceased had been frank about his responsibility for the shootings, but, as the trial judge thought on poor quality legal advice, used a tentative indication in a psychiatric report as a basis for a partial defence of diminished responsibility. This the jury plainly and unsurprisingly rejected.
7. In written submissions it is boldly argued that there was here no intention to kill. The defendant had suggested that his original intention was merely to frighten, that the first shot that hit the uncle may have been either accidental or the result of an “uncontrollable impulse” and thereafter he went into what was variously described as a trance-like state or “hysterical dissociation”.
8. In my judgement it is plain that there was an intention to kill in this case. To start with some eight cartridges were brought to the scene. At the most one or two would have been enough to frighten the opposition. Secondly, the firing sequence which I have set out above, which included at least two reloading exercises, indicated someone in control of his actions.
9. There is an application for an oral hearing of this review. This it is said is appropriate because of the fact that this is “an exceptional case” within the meaning of Hammond [2004] EWHC 2753 Admin. No particulars are given as to the respects in which this case is exceptional. In my judgement it is not one of those rare cases in which an oral hearing is necessary or appropriate to achieve a just outcome for a review.
10. There is a substantial amount of documentation supporting the representation that this Defendant has made excellent progress in prison, participating in numerous programmes and courses, and he has reduced his risk factors to the stage where he has recently been reclassified as a Category C prisoner. Excellent progress of this kind is what is looked for and expected of a life prisoner, and is of course in his own best interests, but is not so exceptional as to impact on what would otherwise be the appropriate tariff figure.
11. Were this defendant being sentenced today under the provisions of the 2003 Criminal Justice Act the starting point for his minimum term would be one of 30 years. I am, however, constrained by Schedule 22 3 (1) (a) of the Act from setting the minimum term higher than that fixed by the Secretary of State.
12. The aggravating feature is of course the fact that this was a double murder which involved the use of a firearm, thought these two features would have been taken into account in reaching the starting point of 30 years. As to mitigating features I am unable to find that the only intention was to cause grievous bodily harm. The age of the defendant is in his favour – he was only 22 - and he was a man of good character and has exhibited deep and genuine remorse.
13. In my judgement the early release provisions should apply to this life sentence and the minimum term to be served for the purposes of punishment and general deterrence is one of 18 years, less the 15 months 28 days that the defendant spent in custody on remand.