Minimum terms
High Court setting of minimum terms for mandatory life sentences under the Criminal Justice Act 2003
Neutral Citation Number: [2007] EWCA 1444 (QB)
Case No: 2004/839/MTS
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN’S BENCH DIVISION
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
Date: 22 June 2007
Before :
THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE DAVIS
Between :
Regina Crown
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Abdullah Ahmed Defendant
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Approved Judgment
Mr Justice Davis :
1. The defendant pleaded guilty to a count of murder on the 14 November 2003 at the Central Criminal Court before HHJ Morris QC and a jury. He was duly sentenced to a term of life imprisonment. The Judge subsequently recommended a minimum term of 10 years imprisonment and also recommended that when released the applicant should be deported.
2. The murder in question occurred on 28 December 2002. That being so I must apply the provisions of the practice as to tariffs generally applicable at that date as set out in the 2004 Practice Direction, in particular at paragraph IV.49.22.
3. The background facts are these. The defendant was at the time a 39 year Somali who had come to the United Kingdom in 1989. Since then he had become addicted to alcohol and spent much of his time drinking and chewing khat. One of his drinking companions was the deceased, a 24 year old Somali, married with four children. The two men frequently would get drunk together and the deceased would annoy the defendant; and they argued and fought. In December 2000 in the course of a drinking session the defendant struck the deceased over the head with a candlestick causing him injuries of a severe nature. In due course a suspended sentence of imprisonment was imposed in respect of that. Thereafter, the defendant was heard to make threats to kill the deceased. On 28 December 2002 he killed the deceased in the course of a drinking session at the defendant’s home by strangling him with a pair of trouser legs. Both men were very drunk. There was no evidence of any fight and the defendant had no other injury. When arrested the defendant in effect indicated that “I did a good job”.
4. In considering what minimum term is to be set I have had regard to all the materials before me including the pre-sentence report prepared at the time and the written representations of leading counsel on behalf of the applicant. These representations include the comment that the applicant was a “most unlikely murderer”.
5. The Judge noted as aggravating factors the previous conviction in respect of violence and the fact that the murder itself was committed during the operational period of the suspended sentence. There were also other relatively minor previous convictions. The mitigating factors were noted as the plea of guilt (albeit entered late in the day). Further, there was some evidence that the deceased would act in a provocative manner towards the defendant when in drink and could cause him to lose his temper. It seems to me also that one might bear in mind the fact that it can be a mitigating factor when there is a background of longstanding drunken violence – although in this case there was nothing to indicate that the deceased had been violent towards the defendant.
6. It seems to me, given the circumstances, that the Judge might well have in fact recommended a minimum term somewhat higher than a term of 10 years as he did. However, that is what the defendant has now been led to expect he will serve before he is considered for release; further, the trial judge would have been well placed to make an overall assessment. On the whole I do not think the circumstances are such as to cause me to increase such a minimum term as so recommended. Certainly, however, it would in my view be entirely wrong to specify any lesser minimum term.
7. In these circumstances, and having regard to considerations of retribution and deterrence, I specify the minimum term to be served as one of 10 years imprisonment; from which there will then be deducted a period of 10 months and 13 days reflecting time spent in custody on remand.