Minimum terms
High Court setting of minimum terms for mandatory life sentences under the Criminal Justice Act 2003
Neutral Citation Number: [2007] EWHC 784 (QB)
Case No: 2004/621/MTS
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
Date: 17/04/2007
Before :
MR JUSTICE GRIFFITH WILLIAMS
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Between :
REGINA
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MICHAEL TERRENCE BALDWIN
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The Hon Mr Justice Griffith Williams
APPROVED JUDGMENT
I direct that no official shorthand note shall be taken of this Judgment and that copies of this version as handed down may be treated as authentic.
Mr Justice Griffith Williams :
1. After a trial in the Crown Court at Cardiff in June and July 2003, Michael Terrence Baldwin [“the defendant”] was convicted by a jury of the murder on a day between 3 and 11 September 2002 of Jenna Louise Baldwin. On 22 July 2003 I sentenced him to Life Imprisonment. In my report to the Secretary of State, I recommended a minimum term of 14 years. This recommendation was not considered by the Lord Chief Justice. Because of the changes introduced by the Criminal Justice Act 2003 [“the Act”] as to how minimum terms for mandatory life sentences are to be determined, the Secretary of State has not notified a minimum term but has referred the case to the Court in accordance with the provisions of Paragraph 6 of Schedule 22 of the Act, for the Court to make an order under Section 269 (2) or (4) of the Act in relation to the mandatory life sentence which the defendant is serving. This requires the stage-by-stage approach identified by the Court of Appeal, Criminal Division in Sullivan & Others [2005] 1 Cr. App. R. (S) 67.
2. This is not a case in which there should be an order Section 269 (4) of the Act that the early release provision should not apply to the defendant and so I must determine the part of the sentence that he must serve before the early release provisions apply in his case. In determining the minimum period, I must consider the seriousness of the offence of murder committed by the defendant and in doing so I must have regard to the general principles set out in Schedule 21 of the Act and to the recommendation I made in my report to the Secretary of State but Paragraph 8 of Schedule 22 provides the court may not determine a period greater than that which, in the opinion of the court, the Secretary of State would have been likely to notify to him under the practice followed before December 2002.
3. I have considered again the Victim Impact Statement of Desiree Baldwin, Jenna's mother as well as a Victim Personal Statement of Nigel Brookfield, Jenna's father which has been prepared for the purposes of this determination. I am mindful of the devastating affects to both parents of the loss of Jenna and conscious that no order of the Court will serve to mitigate their abiding grief. I have reminded myself of the contents of the psychiatric report dated 7th January 2003of Dr Tegwyn Williams and considered also representations made by the defendant's solicitors by letter dated 23 April 2004.
4. Jenna, who was born on 7 May 1987, was the daughter by her first marriage of Desiree Baldwin, whom the defendant married in 1991. The defendant and his wife had two children, born in 1992 and 1994. Jenna, whose surname was changed by deed poll and the defendant, got on well and there were no problems until Jenna was about 13 years old when she became a difficult child. She had a relationship with an 18 year old boy, started to stay out late, occasionally spent the night or nights away from home and began truanting from school. She made no secret of her change of heart about the defendant, making it clear she hated him and swearing at him and abusing him on occasions. Twice, some 2 years before the murder, the defendant went out looking for her and used force to take her home and in early 2002, in the presence of two of Jenna's friends, he lost his temper with her after she had slapped her half-sister in the face - he rushed upstairs, took hold of her and threw her down the stairs. When the autumn term at Jenna's school started on 3 September 2002, she was sleeping away from home, returning during the day to bath and change. She was last seen alive at about midday on Thursday 5 September 2002 by school friends outside the family home in Abersychan. By the weekend, her mother was becoming very concerned about her. On 9 September 2002 the defendant lied to his wife when he told her Jenna had telephoned to say she was alright. This was the start of a course of deceit by him which involved reports of telephone calls and text mobile messages from Jenna.
5. The prosecution case was that the defendant murdered Jenna some time after midday on Thursday 5 September 2002 and buried her body the following day in ground off a lay-by on a back road from Abersychan to Abergavenny (where he worked night shifts at a turkey factory), camouflaging her grave so that it was not found until he took police officers there on 18 November 2002. By then Jenna's body was so badly decomposed that the cause of her death was not ascertainable. The defendant, who was arrested on 29 October 2002, was questioned over 5 days during which he made no admissions at all and told lie after lie as he sought to maintain the pretence that Jenna was still alive. He was charged with murder and remanded in custody. By 18 November, it was apparent the police where likely to find the body and he admitted to his wife that he had buried Jenna, took the police to the grave and provided a prepared written statement in which he claimed Jenna had returned to the house on Tuesday 10 September at about midday and woken him up by shouting to be let in. When he let her in, she followed him upstairs, showing signs of being under the influence of drugs, prodding him in the back and swearing at him. At the top of the stairs, he hit out at her and she fell down the stairs, he went down after her and found her unconscious. He panicked, put her in his car to take her to hospital in Abergavenny but she died on the journey and fearing his wife would not believe that Jenna's death was an accident, he decided to bury her.
6. The prosecution case was that Jenna was probably strangled or throttled and the defendant drew on Jenna's reputation amongst her peers as an occasional drug user, her known antipathy towards him and upon the circumstances of the third occasion when he had assaulted her (see paragraph 4 above) to contrive an explanation for her death. The evidence, which included details of his purchase of a shovel, contradicted his accounts and the jury returned a verdict of guilty of murder specifically on the prosecution case.
7. Applying paragraphs 4-6 of Schedule 21 of the Act, the starting point for determining the minimum term in this case is 15 years. Of the aggravating features of the offence specified in Paragraph 10 which will justify an increase in the minimum term, only (g) 'concealment of the body' applies but I consider the following features of the evidence should be taken into account also in assessing the seriousness of the offence :-
i) The relationship of step-father and step-daughter.
ii) The greater size and physical strength of the defendant.
iii) The defendant's failure to call for medical help when on his own account, Jenna may have briefly survived the attack upon her.
iv) The defendant's persistent and calculated attempts to divert suspicion from himself by reports of text messages and telephone calls reportedly made by Jenna, although this was a feature of the case which is very much linked to the aggravating feature of his concealment of Jenna's body.
I should add that although there was the evidence of the three previous incidents of violence, my conclusion is that on each of those occasions the defendant was provoked into using violence and I am satisfied there was no history of wilful, physical abuse.
8. The defendant did not have the benefit of the mitigation that he had not intended to kill or that he was remorseful, but there were features of the evidence which, in my judgment, significantly mitigated the offence. These were the real probability that there was a row prompted by such matters as Jenna's life style and truancy and the likelihood that Jenna would have abused and insulted the defendant during such a row; while this could not have amounted to provocation in law it should not be overlooked. It may also have been a factor that the defendant who worked permanent night shifts may have been tired –he told a prison psychiatrist that he should have worked days and it would not have happened. Accordingly, I am satisfied that the killing was a spontaneous act and lacked premeditation. Further, the defendant's antecedent history contained no convictions of any violent offending and no convictions since 1991. Applying the provisions of the Act, my conclusion is that the appropriate minimum term, to reflect the defendant's culpability, is in the bracket of 14/15 years.
9. When I made my recommendation on 1 August 2003, I had regard to the provision of the Practice Statement (Crime, Life Sentences) [2002] 2 Cr. App. R 18 subsequently incorporated as part of the Consolidated Practice Direction, Paragraphs 49.22-49.28. Applying those provisions, the starting point for this case was 12 years because none of the features identified in Paragraph 12 applied. Of the aggravating factors identified in Paragraph 14, only (d) concealment of the body applied, but in assessing the seriousness of the offence, I had regard to the features of the evidence which I have identified in paragraph 7 above. The mitigating factors relating to the offence were those identified in Paragraph 8 above.
10. I am satisfied that my then recommendation of a minimum term of 14 years was correct and that the Secretary of State, whose practice at that time would have been to follow the Practice Direction issued by the Lord Chief Justice with effect from 31st May 2002 – see Sullivan & Others above; paragraph 26 at page 324 – would have accepted that recommendation and directed a minimum term of 14 years. I am satisfied also that it is a minimum term which is no longer than that that the Secretary of State would have then notified. In accordance with the provisions of paragraph 8 of Schedule 22, my determination is that the minimum term in this case is 14 years.
11. I must have regard to the requirements of Section 240 of the Act that the time spent by the defendant on remand in custody should count as time served as part of the minimum term and so the minimum term I specify is 14 years less 8 months and 17 days. I make it clear the defendant will not be released until he has served that minimum term and only then when the parole board are satisfied that it is safe to release him, subject to a life-long licence condition.