Minimum terms
High Court setting of minimum terms for mandatory life sentences under the Criminal Justice Act 2003
Case No: 2004/281/MTS
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEENS BENCH DIVISION
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
Date: 27/03/2007
Neutral Citation Number: 681
Before :
THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE PITCHERS
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Between :
REGINA
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GLENN ANSELL
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Approved Judgment
I direct that pursuant to CPR PD 39A para 6.1 no official shorthand note shall be taken of this Judgment and that copies of this version as handed down may be treated as authentic.
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Mr Justice Pitchers:
1. On 23 May 2002 the Defendant, then aged 28 years, was convicted of murder at the Crown Court at Nottingham before Mr Justice Hughes. Mr Justice Hughes sentenced him to life imprisonment.
2. After passing the sentence referred to above, but before the commencement of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, the trial judge made a report to the Home Secretary, in accordance with the practice then in operation, recommending the proper length of term that ought to be served for the purposes of retribution and general deterrence. He stated his view that the proper length of detention for these purposes was 15 years. The Lord Chief Justice agreed with that recommendation.
3. The Act came into force on 18 December 2003. By then, the Home Secretary had not notified the Defendant either of the minimum period which he thought he should serve before his release on licence or that he did not intend that he should ever be released on licence. Accordingly, the Home Secretary referred his case to the High Court under para. 6 of Schedule 22 to the Act for the making of an order under sections 269(2) or 269(4) of the Act.
4. The Defendant and the deceased were associates in the drug culture of Nottingham. They each acted as ‘debt collectors’. It would appear that the Defendant had a real or imagined grievance against the deceased. On the night in question, they were both at the Defendant’s cousin’s home. Each man had taken significant quantities of drugs. The Defendant armed himself with a large hunter’s knife or bayonet. After telling the cousin’s brother to stay out of the way and telling the cousin to leave the room, the Defendant attacked the deceased, stabbing him 60 or 70 times. The deceased was himself armed with a hammer but was unable to retaliate. The Defendant stripped the body and put it into the bath where he nearly severed the head with a cutthroat razor. He then wrapped the body in a carpet and tried to get assistance to dispose of it. That failed. After his cousin’s arrest, the Defendant telephoned the police and told them that he was responsible.
5. The aggravating factors in the case were
i) A savage and sustained attack when affected by drugs;
ii) Arming himself for the purpose of killing;
iii) A deliberate attack on a man unable to resist.
6. The mitigating factors were
i) A deprived, unhappy and probably abused childhood leading to aggression, suspiciousness and long-standing drug abuse;
ii) Relative lack of previous convictions;
iii) Volunteering to the police and accepting full responsibility for the killing.
7. I have read and considered representations on behalf of the Defendant. It is argued on his behalf that this is one of those cases, identified as rare by Thomas LJ in his judgment Hammond v the Secretary of State for the Home Office [2004] EWHC 2753, in which I should direct an oral hearing. I do not agree. There is nothing in this case that puts it into such a category nor is there anything in the submissions on behalf of the Defendant that suggests that oral argument could alter the outcome of the case. I therefore refuse the application for an oral hearing.
8. I have also read and considered representations from the family of the deceased..
9. Were the minimum term to be set in accordance with Schedule 21 of the Act, the starting point would have been 15 years as a minimum term. Balancing the aggravating against the mitigating features would have resulted, in my judgment, in an increase in that term. However, the term specified now must not be longer than would have been specified at the time of the offence. I therefore specify a minimum term of 15 years. I must also give credit for the time served on remand prior to sentence: 11 months 9 days. Accordingly, I order that the the early release provisions in sections 28(5) to (8) of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 apply to this Defendant as soon as he has served 14 years 10 months 21 days.