Minimum terms
High Court setting of minimum terms for mandatory life sentences under the Criminal Justice Act 2003
Neutral Citation Number: [2006] EWHC 1788 (QB)
Case No: MTR/901/2004
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
Date: 26/07/2006
Before :
MR JUSTICE WALKER
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Application by
WORRELL OSCAR BAILEY
for the setting of a minimum term pursuant to Schedule 22 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003
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Judgment As Approved by the Court
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Mr Justice Walker :
1. On 28 June 1995 after a trial at Newcastle Crown Court before Mr Justice Ognall and a jury, the applicant was convicted of murder of his former partner, Diane Amanda Williams and of the attempted murder of her lover, Mark Stuart Crawford. He was sentenced to life imprisonment for murder with a recommendation that a minimum of fifteen years be served before release. A concurrent sentence of 12 years imprisonment was imposed for the attempted murder. The applicant was subsequently notified by the Home Secretary that the minimum period which should be served before his release on licence was fifteen years. He has now applied under paragraph 3 of schedule 22 to the Criminal Justice Act 2003 for the court to determine his minimum term. These are the reasons for my decision on that application.
2. The circumstances of the offence, as set out in the trial Judge’s report to the Home Secretary, were as follows:
“The accused had lived with the deceased woman for a year or two. She left him because of his philandering. He remained “proprietorial” in his attitude. He discovered that she had begun as association (only of some 2 weeks) with a young man. He kept watch on her home. On the night in question, wearing rubber gloves and armed with a knife, he gained access to the house via an upper floor. The woman and her companion were almost certainly in the act of intercourse when he invaded and first perpetrated a sustained and savage assault upon the man in the course of which he armed himself with a second larger knife from the kitchen. He left the man for dead. He then pursued the woman – who had fled the house – across some nearby streets where he tackled her and despite her pleas repeatedly slit her throat. The nature of the attack bore all the hallmarks of an “execution” – a description used by counsel to the jury.”
3. The main issue raised was identity. A secondary issue was provocation, as to which the trial Judge commented:
“I was also persuaded to leave provocation albeit that the pre-meditation and circumstances of the offence left no sensible room at all for that verdict.”
4. In determining the minimum to be served by the applicant, I have directed myself by reference to the provisions of the schedule 22 to the 2003 Act, in particular paragraphs 2 to 4. In assessing the seriousness of the offence I am required to have regard to the general principles set out in schedule 21 and to the recommendations made to the Secretary of State by the trial Judge and the Lord Chief Justice as to the minimum term to be served.
5. I have taken into account the Home Office’s file, including representations made by and on behalf of the applicant.
6. The trial Judge recommended a minimum period of fifteen years, commenting:
“This man was a chillingly cool customer. Although the killing arose from a sexual relationship, the element of “provocation” used in a lay sense was in my view minimal. I formed the impression that psycopathy was an obvious apart of his make up.”
The trial Judge added that this view was “subject to any question of risk.”
7. The Lord Chief Justice agreed with this recommendation. The term notified by the Home Secretary was, as I have said, fifteen years in line with the views of both the trial Judge and the Lord Chief Justice.
8. In terms of schedule 21, it is to be noted that it is only a matter of good fortune that Mark Crawford did not die. The jury returned a verdict of attempted murder, and thus were sure that the applicant intended to kill Mr Crawford. The judge commented that the applicant left Mr Crawford for dead. Under paragraph 4(2) of Schedule 21 the starting point for a murder of two persons involving a substantial degree of pre-meditation or planning would normally be a whole life order. In the absence of such pre-meditation or planning, the starting point under paragraph 5(2) for a murder of two persons would normally be thirty years.
9. Mr Crawford did not die, and the result is that the present case falls within paragraph 6, with a starting point of 15 years. Nevertheless the attempted murder of Mr Crawford is a serious aggravating factor both on its own and because it involved a substantial degree of mental suffering inflicted on the deceased before her death. That mental suffering was increased when the applicant pursued the deceased and tackled her despite her pleas. These matters alone in my view would call for an increase in the minimum term of somewhere between seven to ten years.
10. I must also consider whether the offence is aggravated by a significant degree of planning or premeditation. It is said on behalf of the applicant that having gone to the deceased’s house on the evening in question to tell her that he had obtained a new job, he found she was having sexual intercourse with another man. The applicant broke into the house through an upper floor window, took a knife from an upstairs bedroom, went downstairs and was enraged to see the deceased and her companion having sexual intercourse in the living room. This led him to attack the companion with the knife he had picked up in the house, and to run after the deceased, fatally stabbing her. I cannot accept this account of events, for it is simply inconsistent with the trial judge’s description of the killing as bearing all the hallmarks of an “execution” and his comments about the applicant keeping watch beforehand and equipping himself with rubber gloves and a knife before breaking into the house on the night in question. There is no material before me which would enable me to differ from the trial judge’s assessment in these respects. These matters in my view constitute a substantial degree of pre-meditation and planning.
11. Taking all aggravating factors together they are in my view so great as to increase the starting point by ten years to 25 years before allowing for mitigating factors.
12. The first mitigating factor that is relied upon is provocation and lack of pre-meditation. I rule out lack of pre-meditation for the reasons given earlier. As to provocation, it is said that the deceased had subjected the applicant to physical abuse on numerous occasions during their relationship, and that he had not retaliated. He had sought advice from his friends regarding the domestic violence, but they ridiculed him and thereafter he was unable to discuss it. Following the loss of his job, the deceased suggested a trial separation to which the applicant agreed. However, it is said that he remained committed to the relationship and was very upset at it ending. From this account it can be seen that the alleged physical abuse was on any view something that was in the past by the time of the attack. I see no reason to disagree with the trial judge’s assessment of the element of provocation as “minimal”.
13. It is added that prior to the commission of the offence the applicant was under extreme stress. He had lost both his job and his relationship, and his parents, with whom he was very close, were in the process of emigrating, which contributed to his isolation.
14. These matters, even when taken together with other possible mitigating features such as remorse and character, could not possibly reduce the minimum term to anything close to the fifteen years notified to the applicant by the Home Secretary. By paragraph 3(1)(a) of schedule 22 the minimum term specified by me must not be greater than the notified minimum term. It follows that I must come down to the notified minimum term of fifteen years for that reason. I turn to consider what, if any, further deductions from that figure are appropriate.
15. The applicant has written to the court about the help he gave in relation to an incident on 17 June 2006. His conduct on that occasion was commendable. Even allowing for that commendable conduct, however, the applicant cannot be said to fall within the category of exceptional progress that might have justified some reduction in the minimum term.
16. I am required by paragraph 4(1)(b) of schedule 22 to have regard to matters in s 67 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967 relating to periods of police detention and periods of remand in custody. I have a figure of 14 months for the overall period and a figure of a few days less which excludes police detention. In my view the time spent by the applicant both in police detention and in custody on remand should count towards the minimum period to be served by the applicant. In order to produce that result, it is necessary to deduct it from the otherwise appropriate minimum term. In this regard I compute the period of 14 months as 427 days.
17. Accordingly, the specified period is one of 15 years reduced by 427 days.